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Abstract 
This paper investigates the dynamics of the banking environment in early and late 
transition countries for the period 2000-2012. We consider macroeconomic, 
governance, economic freedom, financial depth, industrial, bank-specific, and 
CSR variables to compare the banking environment in transition countries. Our 
analyses show the presence of differences in the banking environment of two 
groups of transition countries: however, this gap shrunk over the period 2000-
2012. The late transition countries have lower scores in the variables ‘Investment’ 
and ‘Financial freedom’, implying that in the future the governments of these 
countries may focus on improving the investment and financial climate. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The presence of a sound banking sector is important for ensuring that the financial 
system and economy run smoothly and efficiently, as banks play a crucial role in 
channelling funds from lenders to borrowers for productive investment projects 
(Djalilov & Piesse 2011, 2011; Macit 2012). Over the last 25 years the banking 
sector in transition countries has undergone significant changes. Particularly, the 
establishment of a two-tier banking system has been accompanied by 
consolidation, entry of foreign banks, and strengthening of prudential regulation 
and supervision.  It can be assumed that all of these changes posed great 
challenges to transition country banks, as the environment in which they operate 
has changed significantly. Many recent studies focus on various aspects of the 
banking sector in transition countries (Grigorian & Manole 2006; Peresetsky 
2010; Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, & Schobert 2008; Weill 2003), but research 
addressing the dynamics of the banking environment during the post-crisis period 
is limited. Considering the established link between economic growth and 
banking sector development (Levine 1997, 1998), investigation of the driving 
forces of the banking sector in transition countries is important not only for bank 
managers but also for many other stakeholders such as the governments, 
policymakers, Central Banks, and academics. Additionally, banks need to 
generate adequate earnings to maintain solvency, to survive, and to flourish as a 
sound and profitable banking sector in order to better withstand negative shocks 
and to contribute to the stability of the financial system (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, 
& Delis 2008). Moreover, existing studies indicate that bank profitability is an 
important predictor of financial crises (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 2000).         
This paper is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, transition countries’ political 
and economic structure, and especially the banking sector, has undergone 
significant changes during the last 25 years. Many transition countries have 
achieved significant progress in banking, supervisory, and regulatory reform, and 
in the implementation of structural reform in order to to reduce risks and promote 
financial sustainability. However, transition countries, particularly the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU), may still need to further develop their banking environment, 
including their legal institutions and investment-financial freedom. Secondly, 
there has been a plethora of research on the progress of the transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and more recently the Baltic States (Bartlett 2009; Nuti 
2009), particularly on the measurement of banking sector efficiency and models to 
determine the factors that influence best practice. However, the countries of the 
FSU, especially the Central Asian countries, have been largely neglected due to 
lack of data. This paper compares the dynamics of the banking environment in 
transition countries including those of Central Asia.  
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The paper divides 14 transition countries into two groups. The first group 
comprises early transition countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The second group comprises late transition 
countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The aim of this paper is 
to compare the dynamics of the driving forces of the banking environment in 
these two groups of transition countries for the period 2000-2012.  
The paper is structured as follows. The following Section II discusses why these 
two groups of transition countries are different and discusses the relevant 
literature. Section III compares the dynamics of the variables impacting on the 
banking environment for the two groups of transition countries. Section IV 
concludes.   
 
II. Literature Review 
2.1 Why Transition Countries? 
 
Over the last 25 years a plethora of studies have focussed on the transition of CEE 
countries from a centrally planned system to a market economy. However, the 
majority of the FSU countries have been largely ignored due to the paucity of 
reliable information and these countries differ substantially from early CEE 
transition countries. The FSU countries were ruled by a communist regime for 
more than seventy years.  This resulted in a lack of national collective memory of 
any other form of economic organisation or institutions and these countries had no 
experience of managing a domestic market economy prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991.  During the Gorbachev era in the late 1980s, when reforms 
to establish a market economy took place in the Baltic states of the FSU and in 
several CEE countries, the other countries of the former USSR did not follow suit.  
The latter group of countries provide a sharp contrast to countries such as 
Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia, and even to the Baltic states of 
the FSU, which only had a system of central planning for the period from the 
Second World War until the 1990s. This historical legacy has a huge impact on 
how quickly a market economy can be established and emphasises the importance 
of historical background and conditions at the beginning of transition on the 
direction and speed of financial sector development, and its impact on economic 
growth. Secondly, many FSU countries are rich in mineral and energy resources 
that have implications for both economic growth and potential internal conflict 
associated with resource allocation. Thirdly, some FSU countries, especially those 
located in Central Asia, are geographically very extensive and border politically 
unstable countries such as Afghanistan, whose problems can be contagious. For 
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these countries, maintaining economic growth and ensuring financial stability are 
vital to retain social cohesion and sustained development.  
 
The literature exploring banking environment and banking profitability mostly 
uses four groups of factors: macroeconomic factors, governance factors, financial 
depth, and industry and bank-specific factors (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine 
2010; Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, & Haubrich 2004; Levine 1998). 
Following the relevant studies, we now discuss the various factors in the literature 
that impact the banking environment.   
Macit (2012) investigates the determinants of profitability in Turkish banks and 
finds that macroeconomic variables, particularly exchange rate levels and real 
interest rate, have a positive impact on profitability. Analysing structural and 
cyclical determinants of banking profitability in 16 Western European countries, 
Beckmann (2007) states that lagged GDP growth has a substantial pro-cyclical 
impact on bank profits.  
Analysing four regional blocks in Sub-Saharan Africa and one comparator block 
in the Eastern Caribbean using bank-level data, Boutin-Dufresne, Peña, Williams, 
& Zawisza (2013) find that institutional factors are very important when 
explaining high interest margins in the East African community. Additionally, 
Özkan-Günay, Günay, & Günay, (2013) assess the impact of regulatory policy on 
the efficiency of different sized commercial banks in the Turkish banking sector 
over the period 2002-2010. Their results indicate that regulatory policies have a 
positive effect on the efficiency of banks. Particularly, large- and medium-size 
banks outperform small banks.  Moreover, Neyapti & Dincer (2014) provide 
robust evidence that bank regulations and supervision have significant positive 
effects on bank deposits and investment rate and significant negative effects on 
nonperforming loans.  
Many existing studies use industry factors to explain profitability in the banking 
sector. Garcia-Castro et al. (2010) show that a less concentrated banking system 
increases bank profitability in China. However, Beckmann (2007) finds that 
industry concentration does not significantly affect the aggregate profitability of 
banks in 16 Western European countries. Moreover, Berger (1995) finds that 
efficiency and market power do not significantly explain the variances of 
profitability. His results suggest that very large increases in efficiency and market 
share would be needed to significantly increase bank profits.   
Investigating the Armenian banking sector for the period 2002-2006, Dabla-
Norris & Floerkemeier (2007) find that bank size, liquidity, market power, and 
market structure explain a large proportion of cross-bank and cross-time variation 
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in spreads and margins. They also show that the Armenian banking sector has a 
lot of potential to increase cost efficiency and competition.    
Many studies find bank-specific factors important when explaining bank 
performance and profitability. Analysing the banking sector of China, Garcia-
Castro, Ariño, & Canela (2010) show that better capitalised and more efficient 
banks are more profitable. Additionally, Macit (2012) states that both the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total assets and the log of real assets have a significant 
impact on return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) for Turkish banks.    
Fang, Hasan, & Marton (2011) investigate the performance impact of bank 
diversification on loan and asset portfolios in transition economies. Their results 
indicate that bank performance is positively associated with asset diversification 
but negatively related to loan diversification. Additionally, the results show that 
banking liberalisation and corporate governance restructuring enhance profit gains 
from loan and asset diversification; however, legal reforms reduce profit gains.   
We compare the dynamics of macroeconomic, governance, economic freedom, 
financial depth, industry bank-specific, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
variables in two groups of transition countries. We consider the data for 254 banks 
of 16 transition countries obtained from Bankscope. Macroeconomic and financial 
depth variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators 2014. 
Governance and economic freedom variables are obtained from Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi (2011) and the Heritage Foundation, respectively.     
 
III. Discussion 
3.1 Macroeconomic factors 
 
Recent studies have used macroeconomic variables to analyse bank performance. 
Among the most popular are interest rates, exchanges rates, GDP growth, and 
inflation (Boutin-Dufresne et al. 2013; Dabla-Norris & Floerkemeier 2007). Due 
to the lack of data for the exchange rate and interest rate variables for the 
countries under investigation we aim to use only GDP growth and inflation rates.   
Figure 1 shows the GDP growth dynamics of early and late transition countries 
for the period 2000-2012. It indicates that the group of late transition countries 
had higher GDP growth in the period. Additionally, the early transition countries 
were more severely hit by the recent global financial crisis, especially in 2008 and 
2009 (Figure 1). This is because the early transition countries are EU members 
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and are more integrated in the Western financial system where the impact of the 
global financial crisis was severe. Additionally, our second macroeconomic 
variable is inflation, which is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP 
deflator. 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP growth (annual, %) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2014 
 
Figure 2. Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2014 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the level of price change in these two groups of countries is 
very different: inflation is much higher in the group of late transition countries. 
Perhaps the late transition countries’ inflation-targeting monetary policy during 
this period was unsuccessful. The world’s many advanced economies, including 
the early transition countries, experienced quite a low rate of inflation during the 
recent global crisis, while inflation in the late transition countries was quite high 
(Figure 2). In both figures the early transition countries have a similar trend to that 
of the advanced Western countries because they are EU members and therefore 
more integrated into the Western World.   
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3.2 Governance factors 
 
In this section we use six governance indicators from World Governance 
Indicators by Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2011): 1) voice and accountability; 
2) political stability; 3) government effectiveness; 4) regulatory quality; 5) rule of 
law; and 6) control of corruption. Each indicator ranges from -2.5 (lowest) to 2.5 
(highest). There is an on-going critical debate among scholars on the use of World 
Governance Indicators; however, addressing the critics, the authors show that they 
are comparable across countries (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2007).   
Table 1 presents the dynamics of governance development in early and late 
transition countries. ‘Voice and accountability’ captures perceptions of the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government. 
This includes freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Table 1 shows that early transition countries have a better average score for 2000 
than late transition countries, implying the presence of more favourable conditions 
in the former: however, neither of these groups improved significantly over the 
period 2000-2012.   
The second variable, ‘Political stability’, reflects the perceptions of the likelihood 
that a government can be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means. Although both groups have improved their scores, the mean for the group 
of late transition countries remains negative, implying the presence of the threat of 
political destabilisation in these countries.  
‘Government effectiveness’, on the other hand, captures perceptions of the quality 
of public and civil services and their independence from political pressure. It also 
includes the quality of policy formulation and implementation. Table 1 indicates 
that both groups of countries have improved their government effectiveness 
scores, implying improvements in the quality of public and civil services as well 
as in policy formulation-implementation.    
Our fourth variable, ‘Regulatory quality’, reflects perceptions of governments’ 
ability to formulate and implement policies and regulations to promote private 
sector development. Although early transition countries were in a comparatively 
favourable position in 2000, the group of late transition countries significantly 
improved its scores during the period 2000-2012. This implies that their 
governments have been improving the quality and implementation of policies  
promoting the private sector.  
 
9 
 
Table 1. Dynamics of Governance Indicators 
 
      Late Transition     
  Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of 
Years  Accountability Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption 
2000 -0.9108 -0.7282 -0.7679 -0.7913 -0.9896 -0.8482 
2002 -0.9668 -0.6181 -0.8262 -0.7856 -0.9642 -0.9535 
2003 -0.9558 -0.5375 -0.7391 -0.7010 -0.8886 -0.8448 
2004 -0.9620 -0.6500 -0.7196 -0.6494 -0.8586 -0.9523 
2005 -0.9227 -0.6529 -0.7295 -0.7308 -0.8640 -0.8626 
2006 -0.9319 -0.6943 -0.7003 -0.6539 -0.9196 -0.7473 
2007 -0.9616 -0.3326 -0.7064 -0.5385 -0.8510 -0.7934 
2008 -0.9793 -0.3067 -0.6311 -0.4583 -0.7905 -0.7943 
2009 -0.9562 -0.3295 -0.5930 -0.4544 -0.8178 -0.8664 
2010 -0.9554 -0.3766 -0.5889 -0.4442 -0.8223 -0.8865 
2011 -0.9170 -0.4556 -0.5530 -0.4374 -0.8149 -0.8666 
2012 -0.8911 -0.4250 -0.5297 -0.4635 -0.7565 -0.7871 
      Early Transition     
  Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of 
Years  Accountability Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption 
2000 0.8892 0.4456 0.5376 0.8920 0.5098 0.3108 
2002 0.9954 0.8796 0.7124 1.0973 0.6296 0.2966 
2003 0.9579 0.8904 0.7919 1.0557 0.6738 0.4429 
2004 0.9596 0.5865 0.7758 1.0886 0.6878 0.4208 
2005 0.9339 0.7256 0.7685 1.0596 0.6948 0.4701 
2006 0.9017 0.7779 0.8258 1.0502 0.7578 0.4027 
2007 0.9272 0.7167 0.7109 1.0740 0.7754 0.3638 
2008 0.9192 0.6820 0.7582 1.1243 0.8197 0.3394 
2009 0.9572 0.6278 0.7421 1.1175 0.8128 0.3666 
2010 0.9484 0.7289 0.8012 1.1097 0.8313 0.3636 
2011 0.9209 0.7341 0.7916 1.0773 0.8643 0.4099 
2012 0.9065 0.7533 0.8032 1.0839 0.8397 0.4236 
Source:  Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011. The values for 2001 are missing in the 
source. 
‘Rule of law’ captures perceptions of the quality of the law, particularly contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts. Early transition countries 
have increased their scores; however, late transition countries have struggled to 
improve the quality of the law. Our last governance variable, ‘Control of 
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corruption’, considers perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain. Neither group of countries made significant improvements in this 
variable during the period 2000-2012. EBRD’s Life in Transition survey indicates 
the major reasons for corruption in transition countries. The people in these 
countries mostly make unofficial payments to get better public services. Thus the 
governments in these countries need to develop a strategy to overcome corruption 
in organisations providing public services. Overall, the scores for governance 
variables in Table 1 show that early transition countries had better scores in 2000; 
however, both groups of countries have only been improving slowly.  
 
3.3 Economic freedom 
 
In a society with economic freedom and equality, resources and their consumption 
are distributed on the basis of open market competition. A society with a high 
level of economic freedom provides a fair chance of succeeding and energises 
people to achieve their goals. In this section we discuss the dynamics of the 
Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom variables: ‘Monetary freedom’, ‘Trade 
freedom’, ‘Investment freedom’, ‘Financial freedom’, and ‘Business freedom’. 
These variables range from 0 (no freedom) to 100 (very free).  
Table 2. Economic Freedom Variables 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
Table 2 presents the scores for the economic freedom variables for the periods 
2000-2006 (pre-crisis), 2007-2010 (during-crisis), and 2011-2012 (post-crisis). 
The variable ‘Monetary freedom’ captures the stability of a currency and market-
determined prices. The score for the late transition countries is much smaller over 
the period 2000-2006; however, it improved over the entire 2000-12 period. The 
reverse is the case for the early transition countries. Although the data period does 
not include the adoption of the euro in some countries (Lithuania, Latvia), a 
 2000-2006  
(early transition) 
2000-2006  
(late transition) 
2007-2010 
 (early transition) 
2007-2010 
 (late transition) 
2011-2012   
(early transition) 
2011-2012   
(late transition) 
Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean 
Monetary 
freedom 
435 80.06 457 67.79 386 77.25 447 69.47 193 77.87 224 70.56 
Trade 
freedom 
435 78.43 457 70.84 386 86.49 447 78.34 193 87.36 224 80.67 
Investment 
freedom 
435 67.89 457 37.09 386 68.90 447 37.64 193 72.85 224 39.02 
Financial 
freedom 
435 74.28 457 42.69 386 67.18 447 45.19 193 65.96 224 41.65 
Business 
freedom 
435 71.08 457 54.98 386 68.25 447 66.67 193 70.67 224 71.51 
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possible reason for the decrease in the score might be the instability of the euro 
during and post the crisis period, as the EU member states are strongly integrated. 
‘Trade freedom’ considers free inflows as well as outflows of goods and services. 
Although early transition countries have a higher score for the period 2000-2006, 
this gap has been significantly shrinking over time. ‘Investment freedom’ assesses 
the degree to which there exists a free and open investment environment. Neither 
group of countries significantly increased their scores and thus the difference in 
scores remains largely unchanged.  
An efficiently functioning financial system environment provides more 
opportunities for people to succeed by offering diversified funds and resources. 
‘Financial freedom’ captures how efficiently a country’s financial system 
functions. Although this score has been decreasing for the early transition 
countries the gap remains significant, as the late transition countries’ score has not 
improved. The variable ‘Business freedom’ captures the right to establish and run 
a firm without onerous state interference. The early transition countries have a 
much higher score for the period 2000-2006. However, the late transition 
countries’ scores have improved significantly and by the period 2011-2012 their 
score has surpassed that of the early transition countries.  
Both groups of countries have improved their economic environment over the 
period 2000-2012. However, the late transition countries need to improve both 
their investment climate and their financial systems.   
 
3.4 Financial depth 
 
Financial depth compares the financial sector to the economy. There are two 
commonly used variables, banks’ domestic credit to the private sector and 
domestic credit to the private sector. The first indicates total credit to the private 
sector by banks only, while the second shows total credit to the private sector by 
the financial sector: both are usually compared to GDP. This percentage is usually 
high in high-income countries with advanced financial sectors, sometimes 
reaching 100% or even more; however it is low in low-income countries with 
poorly developed financial sectors.      
Figure 3 compares domestic credit to the private sector by banks (as a percentage 
of GDP) in early and late transition economies. It shows that both groups have a 
similar dynamic, which increases towards 2009 and decreases thereafter, perhaps 
due to the impact of the recent global financial crisis (2007-2010).  However, the 
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variable is much higher in the group of early transition countries, showing that 
they have more advanced banking sectors.  
Figure 3. Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2014 
 
The second proxy variable of financial depth, domestic credit to the private sector, 
compares the size of all credits issued by the financial sector to the private sector 
with GDP. Figure 4 compares the size of domestic credit to the private sector in 
early and late transition countries. It shows that the dynamics of the variable is 
similar for both groups of countries over the period 2000-2012; however, financial 
depth is much stronger for the group of early transition countries.  
 
Figure 4. Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2014 
3.5 Industry factors 
The next group of variables used in the analyses are industry and market structure 
variables comprising the Z-score and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Recent 
studies have used different risk measurements for the banking sector (e.g., credit 
risk, default risk). We use Z-scores as the measure of bank risk as it is 
monotonically associated with the measure of a bank’s probability of failure. The 
Z-score is expressed as ROA plus equity-asset ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of ROA. Since the Z-score indicates the distance to insolvency, a higher 
Z-score implies that a bank is less risky. This represents a more universal measure 
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of bank risk-taking and has been extensively used in the literature of finance and 
banking.  
Figure 5. Z-score in Early and Late Transition Countries 
 
 
Authors’ calculations using data from Bankscope 
 
The trend of the Z-score is higher in the group of late transition economies, but 
banks in the group of early transition countries take more risks, as their Z-scores 
are lower (Figure 5). This is consistent with economic theory that banks in more 
advanced markets have better risk assessment expertise and are able to take more 
risks and still survive and flourish.  However, the Z-score levels in both groups of 
countries increased substantially over the period 2008-2012 compared to the 
previous years, implying that the banks tended to take less risks during the 
turbulent period. 
Our HHI is equal to the squared sum of each banks’ market share and thus a 
higher value implies a higher level of concentration. These are reported in Figure 
6, where it can be seen that the HHI is higher in the group of late transition 
economies, indicating a more concentrated market. Additionally, Figure 6 shows 
that the concentration levels in both groups of countries decrease during the 
period 2000-2012. 
Figure 6. HHI in Early and Late Transition Countries 
 
 
Authors’ calculations using data from Bankscope 
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3.6 Bank-specific factors 
 
In this section we discuss the dynamics of various bank-specific variables such as 
Overheads, Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), and Equity to Total Assets (ETA) in 
early and late transition countries.  The Overheads variable is defined as the ratio 
of bank overhead expenses to total assets. In Figure 7 the vertical axis shows 
overheads in percentages and the horizontal axis indicates the year. The results 
show that overheads are lower in early transition countries, indicating that they 
have more expertise in using resources. However, this variable dramatically 
increased in 2009, 2011, and 2012 in the early transition countries, perhaps 
because of the impact of the recent global financial crisis.  
Figure 7. Overheads in Early and Late Transition Countries 
 
 
Source: Bankscope 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Loan Loss Provisions in Early and Late Transition Countries 
 
 
Source: Bankscope 
 
The next bank specific variable is LLP, defined as the value of a bank’s loan-loss 
provisions expense as a share of its total assets. In Figure 8 the vertical axis shows 
the share of LLP to total assets in percentages while the horizontal axis indicates 
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the year. Although both groups of countries have a similar LLP dynamic, the 
share is much higher in the group of late transition countries, implying that the 
banks of early transition countries have better expertise in efficiently allocating 
their resources.    
Our next bank-specific variable used in the analyses is ETA. In Figure 9 the 
vertical axis shows the share of equity of total assets in percentages while the 
horizontal axis indicates the year. The results show that the banks in both groups 
of transition countries have a similar equity-to-total-assets dynamic, but the banks 
of late transition countries have a much higher equity share, implying that they 
rely more on their equity resources and have a lower level of liability.  
 
Figure 9. Equity to Total Assets in Early and Late Transition Countries 
 
 
Source: Bankscope 
 
3.7 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Over recent decades, CSR and its relationship to corporate performance has been 
the subject of an interesting and continuous debate among researchers. According 
to Wu & Shen (2013), companies are usually encouraged to adopt CSR because of 
its benefits to micro- and macro-performance, where the first is generally related 
to the reputation of companies and retaining and recruiting highly qualified 
workers, while the second refers to environmental improvement and reduction in 
social inequality. However, banks’ level of social engagement varies across 
countries and this may come from different perceptions of the impact of CSR on 
bank performance. 
 
Recently, various indicators to proxy CSR have been used in related studies, as 
there is no unanimously accepted indicator to quantify corporate social activity. 
However, there is limited data and research that addresses CSR in transition 
economies. Additionally, various formats were used to publish the banks’ reports, 
which made it difficult to count (either manually or using content analyses 
software) the numbers of keywords used. We use a binary variable of CSR, where 
CSR takes the value of 1 if a bank publishes CSR reports (or uses CSR-relevant 
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keywords in annual reports) and 0 when it does not. Following the study by 
Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten (2011), we searched for the keywords of the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework, referring to it as the global 
standard. In addition to the environmental and social keywords derived by 
Gamerschlag et al. (2011) from the GRI (Table 3), we searched for the two 
philanthropic keywords, ‘sponsorship’ and ‘charity’.         
Table 3. Keywords of the GRI framework 
Environmental Social 
Recycled; energy 
consumption; 
biodiversity; emissions; 
effluents; waste; spills; 
environmental impacts 
Employment; employee turnover; collective bargaining; collective 
agreements; occupational health; occupational safety; training; 
diversity; equal opportunities; human rights; discrimination; 
freedom of association; child labour; forced labour; compulsory 
labour; community; corruption; public policy; compliance; fines; 
sanctions; product responsibility; customer health; customer safety 
We used singular and plural forms of the keywords as well as British and American English. 
Table 4 shows the means of CSR for the two groups of transition countries during 
the periods 2000-2006, 2007-2010, and 2011-2012. Initially, CSR reporting was 
much higher in the banks of the early transition countries; however, the gap has 
been significantly decreasing. This implies that the banks in both groups of 
transition countries have been significantly improving their CSR reporting and 
commitments over time.    
Table 4. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Sources: Annual reports of banks.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper we analysed and compared banking environments in early and late 
transition countries. In particular, we explored the dynamics of the variables 
considered to significantly impact banking sectors in the relevant literature. They 
are macroeconomic, governance, economic freedom, financial depth, industrial 
bank-specific, and CSR variables.   
Our analyses of macroeconomic variables indicate that late transition countries 
have been enjoying higher rates of GDP growth; however, early transition 
 2000-2006  
(early transition) 
2000-2006  
(late transition) 
2007-2010 
 (early transition) 
2007-2010 
 (late transition) 
2011-2012   
(early transition) 
2011-2012   
(late transition) 
Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean Obser- 
vations 
Mean 
CSR 435 0.49 457 0.20 386 0.55 447 0.39 193 0.59 224 0.55 
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countries have been experiencing lower rates of inflation. Overall, governance 
variables are lower in value in late transition countries, implying that early 
transition countries have better governance. The variables of economic freedom 
showed that early transition countries have managed to establish market 
economies with higher levels of economic freedom. Additionally, early transition 
countries have higher rates of domestic credit to the private sector, implying that 
they have greater financial depth.   
Although the banking sectors of early transition countries are more risky (lower 
Z-score), the level of loan-loss provision is higher in the late transition countries. 
This implies that early transition countries have better expertise in allocating 
resources and managing risk. Even though many banks in early transition 
countries have been publishing separate CSR reports, our content analyses results 
show that CSR reporting rates are similar in both groups of transition countries.  
In sum, our analyses show the presence of differences in the banking environment 
of two groups of transition countries; however, this gap got smaller during the 
period 2000-2012. The late transition countries had lower scores in the Investment 
and Financial freedom variables, implying that in the future the governments of 
these countries should focus on improving their investment-financial climate.     
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